Introduction {#Sec1}
============

The current digital signature infrastructure adopts schemes that rely on the hardness of factoring or finding discrete logarithms in finite groups \[[@CR12], [@CR18], [@CR24]\]. Given recent advances in physics which point towards the eventual construction of large scale quantum computers \[[@CR1]\], these hard problems will be solved in polynomial time using Shor's algorithm \[[@CR25]\]. Lattice-based, coding-based, and multivariate signatures are considered quantum resilient schemes in the Q1 model \[[@CR7]\]. However, either their exact security with respect to quantum attacks is still not clear \[[@CR5], [@CR11]\] or their communication/storage complexity is impractical to a multitude of applications, e.g., megabyte keys for the matrices of McEliece-based cryptosystems \[[@CR27]\]. On the other hand, hash-based digital signatures have moderately sized keys (order of kilobytes), and their quantum security relies solely on that of hash functions based on Grover's algorithm. They have been proven to offer simple quantum resilient security properties \[[@CR26]\]. Note that the proofs in \[[@CR26]\] follow the Q1 model where no superposition queries to quantum oracles are allowed \[[@CR7]\].

Hash-based signature algorithms are comprised of two schemes, an underlying signing scheme and an extension algorithm. The former algorithm defines the main signing procedure where a key pair can be used to sign one (Lamport \[[@CR19]\], Winternitz one time signature scheme (WOTS), WOTS++ \[[@CR8], [@CR14]\]) or a few messages (e.g., Biba \[[@CR21]\], HORS \[[@CR23]\], HORS++ \[[@CR22]\], PORS \[[@CR2]\], and FORS \[[@CR4]\]), after which a new key pair should be generated to maintain security against forgery attacks. More precisely, the security of hash-based few time (HBFT) signature schemes decreases after revealing each signature, and hence their bit-security is given under the condition that re-keying is required after *r* signatures. Accordingly, translating this constraint to acceptable attack models implies that a maximum of *r* queries are allowed to the signing oracle.

The extension algorithm is a top level construction that employs several instances of underlying signing schemes (OTS and HBFT) in a Merkle tree structure. Such an algorithm enables signing multiple messages where signatures are verified with one public key (Merkle root). Extension algorithms can be stateful such as Merkle Signature Scheme MSS \[[@CR20]\], eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) \[[@CR9]\], XMSS+ \[[@CR15]\], Multi Tree XMSS (XMSS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{MT}$$\end{document}$) \[[@CR16]\], and XMSS with tightened security (XMSS-T) \[[@CR17]\], or stateless such as SPHINCS \[[@CR5]\], SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$ \[[@CR4], [@CR6]\], and Gravity SPHINCS \[[@CR3]\]. Stateless signature algorithms conform to the basic definition of digital signatures where no state updates are required to guarantee security, and only keys are needed to securely generate valid signatures at any time.

The security of hash-based signature algorithms relies on the security of the underlying basic signing schemes. SPHINCS is a hyper-tree construction that uses WOTS and HORS trees for signing. In \[[@CR2]\], Aumasson and Endignoux investigated the subset-resilience problem \[[@CR23]\] and showed that HORS is vulnerable to weak-message attacks where an adaptive adversary looks for messages that produce smaller Obtain Random Subsets (ORSs). Consequently, they reported a 7-bit decrease in the expected security of SPHINCS against classical attacks. Moreover, they proposed PORS, a variant of HORS which employs a pseudorandom bit generator (PRNG) instead of a hash function to obtain random subsets with distinct elements, thus avoiding the effect of weak messages. However, PORS is not secure against adaptive chosen message attacks where an adversary is able to generate random subsets for as many messages as they want, and select a set of *r* message for online queries. Finally, FORS, another HORS variant, was proposed and is currently adopted in SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$, a round 2 candidate in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization competition \[[@CR4], [@CR10]\]. Compared to PORS, FORS mitigates weak-message attacks by increasing the size of the keys by a factor of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\kappa $$\end{document}$ is the number of random subsets, and the overall signature size is also increased when it is integrated in a hyper-tree structure. On its own, the security of FORS against adaptive chosen message attacks decreases significantly with each signed message, which currently has no known effect on the security of SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$ because it employs a pseudorandomly generated randomizer that is publicly sent along with the signature, and is used as a key for the hash function in FORS to obtain the random subsets. However, if cryptanalytic techniques are devised which can annihilate how this public randomizer is utilized or can break its generation procedure, then SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$ will be vulnerable to adaptive chosen message attacks. Hence, given the significance of SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$ as a candidate for standardization, we believe our analysis of its underlying signature scheme, FORS, is important, along with DFORS which offers a drop-in strengthened candidate.

*Our Contribution.* In what follows, we summarize the contributions of this paper.

We analyze the security of FORS against adaptive chosen message adversaries. We show that its bit security with respect to adaptive chosen message attacks decreases significantly when compared to its security in a non-adaptive setting. We adopt the adaptive chosen message attack model defined by Reyzin and Reyzin \[[@CR23]\] and used in the analysis of HORS and PORS.We propose a hash chaining mechanism that binds the process of generating a message ORS with signing it, which eliminates the offline adversarial advantage and makes ORS generation feasible only for the signing entity. We apply the chaining scheme to FORS and present Dynamic Forest Of Random Subsets (DFORS), a new HORS variant that resists adaptive chosen message attacks. We show that the bit-security of DFORS with respect to adaptive chosen message attacks is more than that of FORS by a factor of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$r+1$$\end{document}$, where *r* is the number of signed messages per key under a given security level.We analyze the security of DFORS with respect to adaptive chosen message adversaries, discuss its limitations, and report its theoretical computational and communication performance. Finally, we compare DFORS with FORS and other HORS variants.

Preliminaries {#Sec2}
=============

In what follows, we provide the notation and definitions used throughout the paper. FORS can be seen as a generalized instance of HORS and it inherits most of the specifications of HORS. Accordingly, for completeness, we provide a brief overview of the HORS signature scheme.

Notation {#Sec3}
--------

Let *n* denote our security parameter. Consider a finite key space $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbb {M}$$\end{document}$, the two hash families *H* and *G* where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$H = \{ H_k : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\kappa \tau }|k \in \mathbb {K}\}$$\end{document}$, and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$G = \{ G_k : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n|k \in \mathbb {K}\}$$\end{document}$. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\kappa \tau $$\end{document}$-bit (resp. *n*-bit) keyed one-way function. Let the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\tau $$\end{document}$ bits, such that the integer representation of a given element is a subset of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$t=2^{\tau }$$\end{document}$. We refer to the set $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\{0,1,\dots ,t-1\}$$\end{document}$ by *T*, and the subset of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ORS_\kappa (m)$$\end{document}$ denote an *Obtain Random Subset* function which returns a $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\kappa \tau $$\end{document}$-bit hash value of a message *m*, formally defined as follows$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} ORS_{\kappa }(m): H_k(m) \rightarrow S_{\kappa }(T)|k \in \mathbb {K} \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$The notion of *ORS* functions was introduced by Reyzin and Reyzin when HORS was proposed \[[@CR23]\]. It has been shown that the security of the scheme is reduced to the subset resilience problem \[[@CR23]\]. More precisely, for a given bit-security level, at most *r* messages can be signed before re-keying is required, otherwise an adversary can find a message whose *ORS* is covered by the union of the *ORSs* of the *r* messages.

### Definition 1 {#FPar1}
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                \begin{document}$$ORS_\kappa (m_1) \cup ORS_\kappa (m_2) \cup \dots \cup ORS_\kappa (m_{r})$$\end{document}$, formally$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} C^r_{\kappa } (m_1, m_2, \dots , m_{r+1}) \Leftrightarrow ORS_\kappa (m_{r+1}) \subseteq \bigcup _{i=1}^{r} ORS_\kappa (m_{i}). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$

If finding the above cover relation for a given *ORS* function is infeasible, then it is said that such a function is *r*-subset resilient.

### Definition 2 {#FPar2}

An *ORS* function is *r*-subset-resilient if for any polynomial time adversary $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ORS_{\kappa }(m_1) \cup ORS_{\kappa }(m_2) \cup \dots \cup ORS_{\kappa }(m_{r})$$\end{document}$ is negligible, Formally$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Pr}[(m_1, m_2, \dots , m_{r+1})\leftarrow \mathcal {A}^{(1^n,\kappa ,t)}: C^r_{\kappa } (m_1, m_2, \dots , m_{r+1})] \le negl(n,t). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$

### Definition 3 {#FPar3}

An *ORS* function is r-target-subset-resilient, if for any polynomial time adversary $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ORS_{\kappa }(m_{r+1})$$\end{document}$ is a subset of the union of *ORS*s of the *r* messages, formally$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Pr}[(m_{r+1})\leftarrow \mathcal {A}^{(1^n,\kappa ,t,m_1, m_2, \dots , m_r)}: C^r_{\kappa } (m_1, m_2, \dots , m_{r+1})] \le negl(n,t). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$

Hash to Obtain Random Subset (HORS) Few-Time Digital Signature Scheme {#Sec4}
---------------------------------------------------------------------

In HORS \[[@CR23]\], the signer randomly generates *t* secret keys each of n-bit length, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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***Security.*** Assuming that *f* is a one-way function, the security of HORS is reduced to the hardness of the (target) subset-resilience problem \[[@CR23]\]. It has been shown that the probability of finding a message ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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***Variants.*** HORS++ \[[@CR22]\] was introduced to provide security against adaptive attacks. A one-to-one mapping function *S*(*m*) that belongs to a cover-free family \[[@CR13]\] is utilized to ensure that for any $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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FORS Security Analysis {#Sec5}
======================
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Figure [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} depicts the signatures of message 100 011 110 using (a) HORS and (b) FORS, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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It can be verified from Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} that if two 3-bit parts of the message are equal, then the same secret key value is revealed in HORS. This fact is exploited in the weak messages attack where an adversary searches for messages that have as many repeated indices as possible, which lead to ORSs containing fewer distinct elements, and thus can be easily covered with the ORSs of the revealed *r* messages. However, this problem is mitigated in FORS because repeated indices select secret keys from different pools. In what follows, we investigate the security of FORS with respect to non-adaptive chosen message attacks.

FORS in a Non-adaptive Setting {#Sec6}
------------------------------

Reyzin and Reyzin introduced clear attack models for analyzing HBFT signature schemes against (non) adaptive chosen message attacks \[[@CR23]\]. Such models are used in the analysis of all HORS-variants, i.e., PORS, and FORS. Specifically, in a non-adaptive setting, also referred to by *r*-target subset resilience problem (see Definition [3](#FPar3){ref-type="sec"}), an adversary is required to first choose *r* messages $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Adaptive Chosen Message Attack Against FORS {#Sec7}
-------------------------------------------

In this setting, an adversary is given the hash key *k* and allowed to evaluate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Dynamic Forest of Random Subsets (DFORS) {#Sec8}
========================================

In this section we present Dynamic Forest Of Random Subsets DFORS, a new HORS-variant that mitigates the offline advantage of an adversary which leads to the adaptive chosen message attack on FORS (discussed in Sect. [3](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}). The main feature of DFORS is that the generation of the *ORS* is performed concurrently with signing such that each signature element is utilized to generate the next element of the *ORS*. In other words, signing and *ORS* generation are bound together using a chaining mechanism that utilizes the revealed secret keys. This procedure ensures that given a message, only the signer is able to efficiently generate an *ORS*. By doing so, even if an adversary has knowledge of *k*, they are not able to compute *ORS*s of a given message of their choice unless they have some secret key knowledge. In what follows we give a detailed specification of DFORS.

DFORS Parameters {#Sec9}
----------------

DFORS uses the following parameters.
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Key Generation {#Sec10}
--------------

In what follows, we give the specifications of the secret and public key generation procedures. Moreover, DFORS is described in Algorithm 2.
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Signing and ORS Generation {#Sec11}
--------------------------
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Signature Verification {#Sec12}
----------------------
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Security and Efficiency {#Sec13}
=======================

In what follows, we analyze the security of DFORS and demonstrate the effect of the dynamic chaining on the security of FORS. Afterwards, the computational cost of the DFORS key generation, signing, and verification algorithms are presented. The bit size of the signature and keys are also given.

DFORS Security Analysis {#Sec14}
-----------------------

In this section, we present a detailed analysis of DFORS with respect to weak-message attacks and *r*-target subset resilience adversaries. More precisely, since the proposed chaining technique does not allow an adaptive adversary who has knowledge of *k* to compute the ORSs of any message of their choice before asking the signing oracle for its signature, DFORS is essentially r-subset resilient. Hence, our analysis focuses on its security when an adversary is given the signatures of *r* messages.

*Weak-Message Attacks.* DFORS inherits FORS mitigation to weak-message attacks \[[@CR6]\] because it specifies an independent key pool for each index in the ORS. Consequently, even if an ORS element is repeated, the corresponding revealed secret keys will be different.
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The computational complexities of the above procedures are given in Table [2](#Tab2){ref-type="table"}.

Comparison with HORS Variants {#Sec16}
-----------------------------
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Table [1](#Tab1){ref-type="table"} shows the significant effect of increasing the number of signed messages, *r*, on the bit security of FORS. On the other hand, this effect is very reasonable with DFORS. For instance, when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Table [2](#Tab2){ref-type="table"} presents a comparison between DFORSand other HORS variants with respect to their computational efficiency, signature and key sizes, and security against adaptive chosen message attacks.

Conclusion {#Sec17}
==========

We analyzed the security of FORS, the underlying hash-based few-time signing scheme of SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$r+1$$\end{document}$. Note that our analysis does not affect the claimed security of SPHINCS$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$^{+}$$\end{document}$  but rather provides a better understanding of the security of its underlying signing scheme and offers a mechanism that can be adopted by most HORS variants to provide security against adaptive chosen message attacks.

A HORS Specification {#Sec18}
====================

The HORS key generation, signing, and verification procedures are given in Algorithm 3.

B Adaptive Chosen Message Attack against HORS {#Sec19}
=============================================
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